FIRST DRAFT EDIT (WIP) =================================================

NC: Any other constraints, objectives for the discussion?

PYM: Um, I think maybe before we start, we can think about sequencing, like, should we try to do a quick overview and then, and then go like more slowly throughout the text or are we doing this linearly? 

NC: I think Klein would say don't go linearly unless the author is going linearly and constructing the idea in that way, which is not really what I think is necessarily happening here, 

PYM: At least not in great detail. Yeah. 

NC: So maybe if you'll indulge me in this experiment, the way that he would always start our discussions would be by asking "what is the philosopher doing?" And then there would be a long pause — a long silence in which no one would know what to say. And then some person or another would gather up the courage to say something, which would almost always be wrong. But then Klein would jump on that and use it as a jumping off point. 

PYM: Sure. Okay. Yeah, let's. Let's do that then. 

NC: So what is the philosopher doing? 

[...awkward pause]

PYM: Well I think there's a sense in which Goodman tells us what he's doing. Like he's offering a kind of a pluralistic epistemology. I forget exactly where it is, but I think it's towards the seventh section — I forget if he says it explicitly but he's just, like, something along the lines of "I'm talking about how we know stuff"

NC: Would you say he's _defining_ a pluralistic epistemology?

PYM: Yeah, or I want to put it more in terms of "offering"

NC: So I think the question that would come out of that is what do we mean by "pluralistic epistemology?"

PYM: Yeah. do you have any thoughts? 

NC: Hmmm —  So we have this language of "worlds" that he's drawing upon throughout — and one other thing which I think we should do at some point is make an attempt at defining "a world" or try to get more clear to ourselves about what a world is —

NC: I'm trying to think, like, what does pluralism mean in isolation? 

PYM: Yeah, I guess when he brings up pluralism, he's maybe speaking of it, more in a metaphysical sense. 

NC: Right, so like on page two, he's sort of invoking William James' _A Pluralistic Universe_. And the metaphysical question there is, "is there one world or is there many worlds?" William James' point in this essay is that these questions are sort of circuitous because if there's one world, it has many differentiated parts, or if it's many worlds, then it's many worlds which can be all be consolidated into a group.

So the two questions are circuitous to one another...and then where does he go with that? 

Ok but the other clarification he makes here is that he's not talking about "possible worlds", in the sense that some philosophers will speak about possible worlds as worlds are which are not actual, or as he phrases it "possible alternatives to a single actual world". Whereas "multiple actual worlds" is what he means. And then he sort of elaborates: in what context would it make sense to say that there are multiple worlds? The example he starts with is "the sun always moves" or "the sun never moves".

PYM: Mhm. As claims about "_the_ world" (so-called).

NC: Right. So the thing that we notice — or he notices, anyway — about these two statements is that they're both true, in a sense. And in what sense? 

Well, he says our immediate inclination is to say that they're not true in different worlds, but — what does he say here... "they describe different worlds. And indeed there are as many different worlds as there are mutually exclusive truths." Okay, I think this is worth emphasizing actually, like the point here is there are these two statements which are both true and which contradict each other. And if there is a single world, then that how can this be? 

Our intuitive explanation for this is not, "oh, there are many worlds, and one statement for each world". Instead we sort of bring it back from "worlds" to frames of reference — manners of speaking essentially. So in one manner of speaking, one statement will be true, whereas the other statement will be true in a different manner of speaking. So if you _interpret_ "the sun never moves" using the frame of reference in which "the sun always moves" is true, then "the sun never moves" would be false, and vice versa.

You could leave it there, and say "oh, well actually there are just different ways of speaking, and you have to contextualize the statement within a particular language. And here is, I think, his master move: he asks, "if I insist that you tell me how the world is apart from all frames, what can you say?". In other words if you take away any frame of reference, any system, and if supposedly these are just different ways of speaking about the same thing, there should be one universal manner of speaking that both of them can apply to, or be translated to, and which everything can be translated to.

In the case of descriptions of motion at least, we can say that we need a frame of reference in order to be able to describe it at all. We can't go without the language. 

PYM: Yeah.

NC: So here's where I get a little fuzzy, but there's a sense in which, to the extent that there are these mutually exclusive languages, there have to be mutually exclusive worlds. 

PYM: And that's true maybe to the extent that worlds depend on descriptions of them, right? Or any meaningful statement about the world or a world depends on being able to articulate it in a language.


NC: Yeah, I think so — but one thing is not to hinge too much on description because he's also talking about painting and music and these non-representational, non-descriptive forms. So how do you fit them into this idea of what a world is?


PYM: And then that gets into the territory of when he talks about like truth versus... I see him as suggesting a way to talk about reality although he does refer to reality like singular reality here and there.

NC: But in a way he's suggesting that that language has reached its limit. Or at least for his own purposes, it doesn't make sense to speak about reality in terms of how well a description "measures up" or corresponds to that reality.

Like his whole point is when you look at a statement like "the sun never moves" or "the sun always moves", there's no thing outside of language that you're using as a measuring point for how well the language corresponds or doesn't correspond. There's just sort of _further language_. 

PYM: Right. Because even a contradiction to a correspondence kind of statement is going to be made with more language. So you can't escape language. 

NC: Right although again it's like, well painting, well music...

PYM: Sure.

NC: In what ways do these fit in, I don't think that's entirely clear, but maybe we get a bit broader version of this argument in section 3, where he's relating it to Kant. So the point he's referencing from Kant is that "there is no perception without conception" — I think that's the slogan, or something along those lines. It's the idea that there's no "given", like an conceptual substrate of perception that we receive and then turn into concepts. When we receive perceptions, they are already sorted into concepts. So for example when I'm looking out, I'm not just seeing undifferentiated masses of color blotted together. What I'm seeing is this spatially oriented universe with an object there (a trashcan).  The trash can is a singular entity within this plane. Same with the fence, the tree, the building. The world is already "cut up" into these entities and relations and properties. We already receive it that way, and there's no way for us to get past that, to reach some sort of absolute underlying thing which coordinates all of our conceptions.

PYM: So in this example, in front of us, we probably both agree that there's a trash can, there's a fence, there's a tree, there's Bobst library... and in order for us to even have this conversation and make a statement that there's a trash can — which seems like a statement of just something we're purely perceiving, like there is a trashcan in front of me, or I perceive a trash can 6 to 10 feet in front of me — for this language, for our conversation to have any kind of meaning requires prior conceptions to exist, prior experience of the world, turned into conception? Or articulated by and made meaningful by conceptions? For us to even agree whether or not like this is true?

NC: Yeah, though it's not even a matter of prior experience because Goodman would want to say this is built into perception itself. The example he gives is these psychological experiments that were done, where two discrete points of light were flashed in a sequence. What they observed is that if you do these at a certain speed, then the human eye will perceive it as a circle moving from one place to another. And then they did like ever increasing complexities of this, where they would flash like one shape and then another and another, and then the shape would morph into a different shape, or it would change color. It would do all of these things which rarely were actually happening (or what we might say from a certain frame of reference is actually happening), which was just shapes being flashed one after another. And then our perception engine is doing the work of transforming that into something fluid. 

PYM: My understanding of that example, which he brings up in the deletion and the sublimation section, is that he was talking more about continuity, in how visual perception tends towards manufacturing continuity across gaps. So I'm not sure exactly how that connects to this idea that perception according to Goodman requires conception.

NC: I see what you're saying — so the way in which it's related to me is through this idea that perception isn't just passively receiving. It's sort of _creating_ at the same time. 

PYM: Okay got it.

NC: Another example is we see a sequence of: a person being here, a person being here, a person being here, a person being here, a person being here... moving past us. [person on a bike coming past] And there's our example. And then in our minds, we stitch those together into a single fluid motion of an entity across time. Or, me thinking of you as a singular entity, with a unique identity, with an identifier and certain properties across time. Whereas all I'm perceiving in theory would be   snapshot at this time, snapshot this time...

PYM: Right. It's just been a week since we last saw each other, but somehow you recognize me as belonging to the same name Patrick that you referred to me last week. 

NC: Or the other beautiful example of this is the Theseus. In that case, the boat's material is getting replaced over time, and none of the original material is left, so the question is, "well, is it the same boat?" I think Aristotle tries to address this in terms of "design", like it's unified by a design across time, the form of a boat — though I don't know Aristotle enough to be explaining this.

PYM: That's interesting though — look, let's drop Aristotle and just suppose that one way to solve this problem of the ship is that they're unified by the same design. And the design is like a concept or a framework which we use to interpret the continuity of the ship — assuming we're saying it's the same ship — when it was at place A and it was at place B.

NC: And this is connected to when he says "identification rests upon organization into entities and kinds. The response to the question 'same or not the same' must always be 'same what?'. In that case, if you were to ask if it's the same material, the answer would be no. Same location...

PYM: Well it is the same material isn't it?

NC: It's not the same material! The conceit is that you're replacing the ship's boards one at a time.

PYM: I think I'm working with a different story of the ship of Theseus. My understanding of the story was that piece by piece, each panel was moved. And then the question is, is it the same ship? Or there's also the question of when does the original part being deconstructed no longer become the ship, and when does the reconstruction, in a different location but using see the same parts... but maybe we should just decide on which story you're working with. So you're working with the story of the ship of Theseus as—

NC: replacing one board at a time. Although, yeah, I think the other case would to be pretty functional as well. But yeah, so in that case, assuming it's different materials, you can't say it's the same thing because the materials have changed, or the same position, or you could come up with various things. But design is maybe one way of conceptualizing identity, which captures what is most intuitive to us. 

And I think that's another important thing: when philosophers have tried to come up with these bases for defining things or identifying things, they're sort of trying to construct something around what is intuitive to us and what makes the most sense to us.

And that connects to what Goodman is saying in yeah, that the right question is always "same in what sense?". And the basis for that is relevance, what is relevant in a particular situation. A

For example, in the case of identifying an entity as continuous across time. Like let's say there's a cat coming up to me. It's useful to think of that as a continuous entity in that allow me to predict something about what's going to happen next. 

PYM: Now we're getting into pragmatism, right?

NC: Ha! Yes, and I think there's huge overlaps there. But I'm mentioning it without that context — like what might be relevant is I can expect that I'm going to feel a brushing up against my leg, if I know something about cats and I can identify this as a cat and I can identify it moving across time, moving towards me in space as a cat. It'll f have that practical relevance. 

Maybe we can think of, like, the way that our natural perceptual systems have evolved over time is in such a way as to be attuned to these practical considerations which allow us to survive and reproduce. Similarly it's sort of practically valuable to think of this trash can as a discrete entity. 

PYM: Yeah. Okay, so a discrete entity with certain — like there's a conception of the trash can we have which serves our navigating the world. 

NC: Maybe I can give you a more intuitive example: this idea again with the spots, of being able to identify discrete changes over time as something continuous, would help in hunting an antelope.

If an antelope is moving and you want to hit it with the spear, you can anticipate where it's going to be at a certain time and throw your spear in that direction if you're thinking about it as a continuing entity. These are all very rudimentary examples but yeah, this idea that we're holding everything together in a certain way, which helps us navigate the world, and in doing so survive and reproduce. 

PYM: Yeah. I wonder if we're getting too much into like, this is how worldmaking works and this is why worldmaking is the way that it is, given the pragmatist views that you're bringing in. So like Goodman gives that example in the deletion and sublimation section about the dots moving and how like we we can perceive it as a kind of continuous movement of a singular shape, and you're bringing in these explanations as explaining, this is maybe why our brains — I wonder if we're getting too— 

NC: Yeah, we don't need to dwell on that. I think the reason why I was bringing it up is that one of the things that I think he's drawing attention to is that it's not just a sort of process of learning by which come to understand that we're all divided in certain ways. It's sort of built into like the way that our brains function, into our psychology. And at that core level, understanding and processing is a creative process. 

PYM: That makes sense. That that's a helpful connection, I think. 


NC: But I guess maybe we can sort of just return to worlds. 

PYM: So the chapter of this title is Words Works Worlds. Why do you think why do you think this triad? Aside from it being nice alliteration or something. Well, it's not nice, but—

NC: It's a good alliteration. Yeah, this is also a very good "Kleinian" question because he'll always say, like, "what does the 'and' between these two words mean?" But I think in this case the pairing of these three words is it's supposed to be something of an identity relation, or a "same kinds" relation.


PYM: As in, these three things are of the same kind, you're saying?

NC: Yeah. In that we can identify a language or a work of art with with reality in some sense, which is still sort of ambiguous to me. There's a leap that still feels illicit, jumping from like, "we have these different ways of speaking about the world" to "we have these different worlds". 


PYM: Do you think it could also be said that he's kind of equating these three? Like worlds are words, and words are worlds, and works are worlds, and worlds are works, and words are works, and works are words? How do you think he would respond to that interpretation of the title here?


NC: Yeah, well, I think being a devious logician, he would first want to sort of temper our expectation there in saying like, there are things that are true about words which are not true about words. For example there are a certain amount of letters that are in a word. But you can't say that a world has a certain amount of letters. So I think I think it's not that kind of identity. But it's some kind of identification or... yeah, I don't know. I think the move with the sun statements is that we have these irreconcilable yet both true descriptions of the world. And we take that to imply in some sense that there are multiple worlds. 


PYM: I have somewhat of a issue here, or maybe I'll say I don't know if I have an issue here. I just want to maybe deal with this a little bit: why can't we just say of these statements, the sun always moves and the sun never moves, that if they are equally true, then they aren't at odds with each other? 

NC: Wait say that again?

PYM: Goodman says the statements "the sun always moves" and "the sun never moves" though equally true are at odds with each other. And I think I think we both kind of get what he's saying here, but — and maybe I'm just being pedantic about the language here — if they're equally true, then they're not at odds with each other. 

NC: Haha!

PYM: Okay I guess we know what he means or we think we know what he means—

NC: Well okay but actually this might be a presumption about about true statements. Like in order for statements to be to be true they must not be at odds with each other. So if you read it that way, then he's contradicting himself. But his point is that this very axiom turns out to not be the case.


PYM: I guess this is a very pluralistic way of putting it then — 

NC: Well I guess, it's a very everyday way of putting it. Like you might show someone the first statement and they'll say, "sure, that's true". And then show them the second statement, and they say, "sure, that's true... wait a minute!" I think in our ordinary way of speaking about statements, we don't immediately have the tools to differentiate different frames of reference from one another. And that's where the further elaboration comes of "in a certain sense this is true, and in another sense that's true". But I take your point it is a sort of devious way of speaking.

[a pair of friends pass, singing "Love is an Open Door" from Frozen]

PYM: Well, you know what, I guess maybe what I should be doing is just asking in what sense does he mean that they're equally true, and in what sense does he mean that they're at odds with each other?

NC: Yeah, I think that's a good question. One way of initially answering that is, they're saying the opposite things about the same object. So they're attributing the opposite properties to the same object.

PYM: Yeah.


NC: So we have this singular object, the sun, which we might say is shared between two different worlds. And the properties are the same... like these two frames of reference are very similar. It's just the point of view that's different. But motion means what motion means. I guess it's predicated on, like "from this spot, it can be seen that this is moving from A to B" or "this is staying still". 

PYM: And across this period of time.


NC: Right. Like I remember in physics class, the example was there's someone sitting in the back of a truck driving on a road, and there's another car behind them, and there's another person just standing by the road. For the person standing by the road, the cars are both moving. But relative to the person in the truck, the other car isn't moving at all, or it's staying the same distance—

Even as I mention those examples, I feel conflicted because our intuitive response is not, "oh, these are conflicting things". Even in the truck example, I think the driver would say "that other truck is moving". Like they would still speak from that global perspective. They wouldn't be like, "oh no, relative to me on the track, the other car isn't moving at all". 

There's a slipperiness here that, like, I'm not I feel hesitant to sort of, like, take take. Could have been all the way. I like, like, follow Goodman all the way at this point that like these are sort of like equally true statements in different universes. Um, yeah, like I have difficulty even, like, articulate ing if the concern is, but it's like, I think, I think me too.


AUTOMATED TRANSCRIPT, YET TO BE EDITED =========================

00:36:20:06 - 00:36:54:05
Unknown
Yeah. But I mean, it feels like an elicit leap. Like, uh, like a jump that, that isn't warranted to, to go from. These are different manner of speaking to like these are different realities. Um, but at the same time, the sort of line on page three and four is really kind to me of like, if I insist that you telling me how, how it is, apart from all frames, what can you say?

00:36:54:07 - 00:37:34:21
Unknown
We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described. Our universe, so to speak, consist of these ways rather than of a world or of worlds. Um, yeah. And then he goes on to sort of talk about like, for example, the way a physicist speaks about reality versus the way that a biologist speaks about reality, which is the way that a psychologist speaks about reality, like simultaneously a mass of molecules, a mass of cells, and that sort of thinking during the um and uh, and in some sense these can be taken to sort of, uh, cancel out the others.

00:37:34:23 - 00:38:05:23
Unknown
Um, like, yeah, what, what, uh, Feynman, the physicist, is to say sometimes in his lectures by the table. So they said that said it once a collection of like the, like this is just an approximation. There's not really a sort of isolated entity here. It's just our minds are, are like our eyes sort of perceiving this mass of molecules which are sort of in constant constantly in, in sort of small motion moving in and out.

00:38:06:00 - 00:38:35:14
Unknown
Uh, we sort of approximate them as this like singular constant entity, right? And this is in the world of the physicists, this is in the world of the physicists, and that, that that's within the world of physics where I that perfectly adequate way to talk about things. Yeah, the atoms take precedence over like any, like, like object, like the object is just an approximation of this like cluster of, of atoms or particles.

00:38:35:16 - 00:39:13:05
Unknown
Mm hmm. Yeah, right, right. Yeah. Or maybe demarcation or something. Yeah. In in space time or so. Yeah. Yeah. So, um, I wonder if it's helpful maybe right now to backtrack and, and maybe think what we've been talking about so far up until this point in light of maybe the original question of what is the philosopher do? Yeah.

00:39:13:05 - 00:39:34:24
Unknown
What is he doing. So we so all right, at least I first mentioned that I think he's offering a kind of pluralist, pluralist epistemology. Um, and I don't know, do you feel like we do you feel like I think so far we should to restate that without. Yeah, sort of like philosophical terminology. Yeah, as much as we can say.

00:39:35:02 - 00:40:32:20
Unknown
Yeah, yeah, yeah. I agree. I think, I mean one, one way of, or one at least part of it is there are multiple contradictory yet uh, correct ways of describing, describing what? Yeah. The world through descriptions of the world, let's say, and this is the, the plural one world versus many world pluralism thing of many worlds are just one world and one world as many, although okay, so it's something I maybe I'm not getting is that and maybe it's because I haven't read.

00:40:32:20 - 00:41:15:22
Unknown
James is a pluralistic universe, but so my understanding of monism and pluralism, um, within the world of metaphysics at least, which I assume these terms are being used, referring to like the metaphysical, uh, like concepts of monism and pluralism is that these have to do with like, um, like when you go all the way down in reality in the world, what's at the bottom of everything and monism is that the Monism believes or suggests that there is there's a single there's only a single, uh, I don't know, thing being whatever at the bottom of, of everything.

00:41:16:02 - 00:41:38:00
Unknown
That's substance. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Right substances right, right. And pluralism suggests that there are more than two dualism would be just two. Right. Yeah. Although I think it's it's, I think the question here is like Yeah I think like I think James is addressing the the monism versus dualism too. I think he's saying like the one versus many question.

00:41:38:00 - 00:41:58:10
Unknown
Yeah. Be that two or more classes under scrutiny because so I think to, to put it in the sort of most familiar terms in terms of tradition like the sort of mind or body dualism, well there may be a main substance and a body substance, but they're both part of a part of a world in which these two exist.

00:41:58:10 - 00:42:25:04
Unknown
And somehow interact with each other. Mm hmm. Mm hmm. And so, um, yeah. So, like, I think like, James's point is that there that there's sort of not much this question of like, is there one thing or are there are two things because if there's two things and they're both part of the same thing, and if there's one thing, it comprises many things.

00:42:25:06 - 00:42:50:11
Unknown
So like this is that yeah, like right, like the Spinoza versus Descartes thing for, for Descartes, there's mind and there's body and then mind somehow influences body. Uh, and Spinoza was like, That's ridiculous. And there must really just be one thing which, which branches out into different modes. Was that his. Yeah. Or different attributes, actually. Okay, Sorry. Okay.

00:42:50:13 - 00:43:20:20
Unknown
Uh huh. Uh huh, different. Okay. Different attributes of the same thing. Yeah. Okay. So. Well, yeah, so different attributes. I think. Yeah, this is like individual Spinoza, but like different ways of concept. You can conceptualize reality through the attribute of, of body of, of, of like space and physics. Uh, and you can also conceptualize the totality of reality through mind.

00:43:20:22 - 00:43:58:13
Unknown
Uh, and so there's an idea, of course, that sorry, you can, you can conceptualize the entirety of reality through body or the entirety of reality through Okay. My okay, got it. So, um, so like, and so for every bodily thing there is, there's a mental thing, there's an idea that corresponds to it. So for, for that trashcan, there's an idea of a trash can to, um, and so, like, his point is the attributes is like they're there, there are multiple like, like completely exhaustive ways of describing the world.

00:43:58:15 - 00:44:33:14
Unknown
So you can it's interesting because this is this actually does have parallel to Goodman in the you can describe the entirety of reality in terms of particles in in in relation and in collision and whatever with each but this is only true of the entirety of reality can only be if there so if if if it's true that you can describe the entirety of reality in terms of particles in the relations and maybe, maybe there's a better way to put that statement, but maybe you can work with that for now.

00:44:33:16 - 00:45:20:14
Unknown
It's I think what you said. Yeah. Okay. If it's true that you can describe the entire world the entirety of reality in terms of particles in their relations, then then you're kind of assuming, then it must also be true prior to that that the world only consists of particles and the relations with the say so. So what? Like like a reality in which there are things that are made of particles and don't have their existence or whatever grounded in something like particles in their relations, then that reality isn't describable in its entirety by just the language of particles and relations.

00:45:20:16 - 00:45:49:15
Unknown
What we I think I'm I'm still not so I would say the the world that consists only of particles in their relations can be described in its entirety by language of particles and Sure. And the relations, right? Yeah. So where am I going with this or what? Or what or why do I, I you're saying like I like I mean, there are things that just aren't included in that world that are invalidated in that world.

00:45:49:17 - 00:46:25:08
Unknown
So like, in the, like, like, like thinking feeling humans are Yeah. Minds ideas are just don't exist in that world. It's sorry in the meeting for so what I'm saying is I think what I'm make my gut reaction behind what I'm saying I think is is this is what you're saying an insistence on a particular world as really like the world because there are ways of talking about the world.

00:46:25:08 - 00:46:54:12
Unknown
And let's just say there is another world in which particular sorry language about particles and their relations isn't can be can be used to comprehensively describe that world. So the world in which we're thinking just about human conceptions like ideas that humans make of. Yeah, world the world or worlds or whatever. Right.

00:46:54:14 - 00:47:28:09
Unknown
Do you see what I'm saying? Like, I think so. Like I think what it branches out of is like this conflict of like, yeah, like, like it's like physics variance order authoritatively argues that is an exhaustive description of the world. There are not things like left out right and like Dennett for example would would agree with that. Yeah but like like there there are multiple like here's the sort of thing that's difficult to swallow, I think.

00:47:28:11 - 00:48:06:15
Unknown
And I think maybe Goodman just wouldn't say this. I'm not sure. Actually, I think he's saying it or not saying it, sort of the pluralism Mormonism thing, but it's like there are multiple completely exhaust, active and yet contradictory descriptions of reality. So the physical, the biological, the psychological, however many other like worlds, um, are like completely exhaustive in the way that they describe a reality and they conflict with other with other descriptions of reality.

00:48:06:17 - 00:48:36:10
Unknown
And so are they describing like one world or are they describing like, like many worlds? Is it's in some sense a moot question, I think, for Goodman Like he's sort of like like he's toying with this boundary. But I think it's difficult to to swallow or understand because it's like, are we talking about one thing being described in multiple ways, or are we are we talking about like multiple different things?

00:48:36:12 - 00:49:08:24
Unknown
And maybe that's yeah, maybe that's the trick that like, like there is no so there is no in order to describe the world, we have to do it in a like in a particular way. And like there's no way of describing the world without a particular like we're confined. Yeah. In describing the world we're confined to our ways of speaking about as I think is the quote.

00:49:09:01 - 00:49:48:14
Unknown
So yeah. And so he also I think he says like the world apart from the way that we describe it and conceptualize and sort of experience is sort of like, like not important, like the world is only important insofar as we like experience or interface with it in some way. And so like if that's what we're conflicted about, that we have these different descriptions which don't, which don't quote like coalesces that very term or converge that are, that are at odds with each other, that aren't at odds with each other.

00:49:48:16 - 00:50:13:05
Unknown
Yeah. Yeah. Like, like the fact that we have these worlds that are around each other that, that, that don't agree. Um, if the thing that makes us unwilling to accept that that these worlds can both be true is the fact that they could both be describing the same thing, then like forget that same thing they're describing all we care about is the ways of description and the ways of validating those ways of description.

00:50:13:05 - 00:50:47:00
Unknown
Yeah, yeah. The maybe coherence is a helpful way to think about this. It's like, are are the claims of the physicists coherent within the world of physics? Um, I mean, I mean he later later he does get to what issues of translation or Yeah and I think he has some other language as well I think but I think that's important because the validation question is important here because okay like so here's one thing we can say he's doing maybe this is one way of getting it like, like a basic principle he's doing he's saying a correspondence theory of truth.

00:50:47:00 - 00:51:16:09
Unknown
Is it going to work or like the idea that our statements about reality correspond to some single thing outside of reality fails to be an adequate, adequate way of speaking about truth and thinking about what truth and reality are and how they work. Um, uh, and instead we just have, we have to think more about like, like alternate ways of validating, validating truths.

00:51:16:11 - 00:52:04:18
Unknown
Um, so sorry if I could, you know, because I think this is really that, um, would you say that Goodman From how you understand him? Right. Um, uh, that he's not, he's not offering worlds this pluralistic worlds kind of view here as a better way to talk about, quote unquote, reality than, something like a correspondence theory of truth or something, but rather he's saying that we shouldn't be concerned with statements about we shouldn't talk in terms of things being true or not about reality as a whole, about the world.

00:52:04:18 - 00:52:24:16
Unknown
Maybe maybe this is synonymous here, the world and reality. Well, okay. I think there's a sort of there's a studious nature to this in that he's not saying to the layman or to the physicist or the biologist. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Stop talking about one reality. Right, right, right. You're saying different types of truths suit different purposes. Yeah. Yeah.

00:52:24:16 - 00:52:54:14
Unknown
Like even sort of self reflectively. Yeah. Talks about, like, how he how he is validating his own world. Yeah. So that right versions and actual worlds are many does not obliterate the distinction between right and wrong versions, and it does not recognize merely possible worlds answering to wrong versions and does not imply that all right into alternatives are equally good for every or indeed any purpose.

00:52:54:16 - 00:53:20:07
Unknown
Not even a fly is likely to take one of its wing tips as a fixed point. We do not welcome molecules or concrete as elements of our everyday world, so molecules are not a sort of relevant way to the sort of everyday person of navigating the reality. It would be very complicated to do so, sort of like conceptualize all of the particles and all these ways to sort of cease to be able to see different things as sort of separate entities.

00:53:20:10 - 00:53:47:11
Unknown
Right? Um, yeah, continuing on continuing on the painter who sees the way the man in the street does will have more popular than artistic success. So sort of conversely to that sort of specialist in a certain field, say say a painter, if they're sort of buying themselves to the way that we sort of ordinarily speak and think about things, then they're not sort of is going to sort of progress in their own in their own practice.

00:53:47:13 - 00:54:06:03
Unknown
Yeah, I think it's like the same for the scientists that the scientist tries to speak in terms of everyday, like ordinary options that objects, and it's never going to get past like Newtonian physics and yeah, like it's not like the the science isn't going to be as powerful as it is if it doesn't develop this own way of thinking and conceptualizing the world.

00:54:06:03 - 00:54:32:00
Unknown
Yeah. Um, it seems like he, he likes a kind of like social view of or maybe privileges some kind of like a social view of, of truth or, or, or truth or real statements about the world. Yeah. And I think this, I mean, he, he calls himself earlier like a constructivist, right? Yeah. Um, near the beginning, I think.

00:54:32:02 - 00:55:06:12
Unknown
I guess. Sorry. Construction of this. Um, but which, which is where you before you continue on you the last line here. Okay. And the same to us for to hear metaphysics philosophy contemplates a vast variety of worlds, finds the only versions meeting the demands of a dogged and deflationary nominalism finds that only versions meeting the demands of a diet and deflationary nominalism suit his purposes in constructing philosophical systems so he has certain aims and priorities as a philosopher that demand that he look at the world in a certain way.

00:55:06:17 - 00:55:52:20
Unknown
But he's not imposing that way of looking or thinking about things or speaking about things onto the everyday person, onto the artist, onto the scientist, Anyone else? Yeah, maybe just other philosophers. Sure, sure. Yeah, yeah. Or what he's doing. Later, he sort of talks about truth as being more like selling something than like proving it. Um, and so one way you can think about this book is he's putting forward a certain way of thinking and speaking out about the world or the world in, like, in the aim of, like, like here look at the sort of clear the type of clarity that this way of thinking about things provides.

00:55:52:22 - 00:56:18:07
Unknown
So here's the value and the relevance of this way of thinking about things. And like I'm proposing this as one way of thinking of things which you can take or not take. Yeah, um. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. So maybe then maybe what he's doing is not if we can go back to that original question, maybe what he's doing is not offering an epistemology, but more.

00:56:18:09 - 00:56:44:13
Unknown
Well, no, no, no, not, not. These aren't necessarily mutually exclusive, but maybe what? I'll just say it this way. Maybe. Okay, let's say let's. Maybe we can try to get a more layman's explanation or a more layperson's language like grab on. You were saying something earlier about, like, social, uh, like, oh, like, uh, yeah, I remember the exact way you phrased it.

00:56:44:15 - 00:57:07:09
Unknown
Uh, I forget it too, but I think I. Yeah. Can you maybe try to finish that thought? Yeah. Yeah, sure, sure, sure. So that the line that, that made me talk about it in that way was like the physicist and the painter. Yeah, I think especially the. Well, yeah, physicist as well. But the painter who sees the way the man in the street does will have more popular than artistic success.

00:57:07:11 - 00:57:34:06
Unknown
Um, I mean, we could even rewrite this like, it doesn't even have to do with popularity or success, but like, the man, the sorry, the painter who sees the way the man in the street does will be better understood or something like that, Right? In the sense that, uh, or better when a by a certain community, because I think this is the social part of it, of like, yeah, conventions totally.

00:57:34:08 - 00:58:05:02
Unknown
So yeah, like within the sort of art world or like the art galleries and museum world, there are certain ways of speaking and thinking like any artist has to learn, for example, in constructing artist's statements and in sort of describing and talking about their work and, and like selling their work, uh, that like you have to sort of like, uh, like participate in a certain world or a certain way of speaking and thinking in order to sort of be successful in a certain domain.

00:58:05:04 - 00:58:33:03
Unknown
Well, I think what he's getting at here, at least with this line and not, not that that's not valid, I think, but at least in the line here, the painter who sees way the man on the street does will have more popular than artistic success is maybe a misreading, but is that if a painter can output work, which sees the world in line with just the average person, which I take that to be the answer.

00:58:33:04 - 00:58:55:14
Unknown
I think that's kind of what is going out. This man in the street is just the average person. They will be more popular, more recognized, more understood, more maybe liked. I don't know. Yeah, he's implying positively you're more liked than than, say, a painter who just. Who doesn't. Yeah. Who has a, like their own personal language or challenges the ways in which we.

00:58:55:14 - 00:59:21:08
Unknown
Sure. Yeah. And he talks a lot about this like with like Picasso and I can't remember well, like this idea that, like, they changed the way that we that we see things. Yeah. So, like, they challenge our normal conceptions of the world, right? Yeah. I was a Picasso, and I, I think it's pretty early on. Oh yeah. Okay.

00:59:21:08 - 01:00:17:19
Unknown
Well I think it's, I'm looking at a Van Gogh line, but, you know, I don't think it's a great line. Command of Picasso. Yeah, it's I mean, you Okay, well, let's find a place where he is talking about, like. Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. We have no black car. Okay, well, okay. I think this passage serves a purpose. Sure.

01:00:17:19 - 01:00:49:23
Unknown
It doesn't mention Picasso. Sure, but, um, some of most stripped or any segment emphasis on page 11, some of the most striking contrast of emphasis up here in the arts. Yeah. Many of the differences among portrayals by Daumier in Ingram singers Michelangelo and Ro are differences in aspects. Accentuate that What counts as emphasis, of course, is departure from the relative prominence according the several features accorded the several features in the current world of our everyday scene with changing interests and new insights.

01:00:49:23 - 01:01:18:20
Unknown
The visual weighting of features of book or line or stance or light alters and yesterday's level world seem strangely perverted. Yesterday's realistic calendar landscape becomes a repulsive character caricature. So like in like one way of reading the line that we were reading earlier, it was like, like exactly in the way that an artist sort of counters their everyday ways of seeing is sort of like how they're successful in sort of changing the ways that we and we view the world.

01:01:18:22 - 01:01:51:16
Unknown
Yeah, but maybe not always. Maybe it's contextual to like, like how, how the average person's relationship with art is shaped by economy or Yeah, public access to art or, or lack of public access to art or whatever. Right? So, so this is why I think the social thing is really sticks out to me. Yeah. In that. And I really like it because I think it's I think he makes a lot of room for talk about like politics of truth or claim making about the world reality worlds, whichever we want to use.

01:01:51:16 - 01:02:25:20
Unknown
But um and and again going to the construction analyst claim that he makes about himself my understanding of construction wisdom is that within science it it understands the endeavor of the sciences as efforts which are based on like constructions of groups of people who have come to agree on certain axioms or series or laws, etc.. Um, would be axioms as a mathematic term anyway.

01:02:25:22 - 01:02:51:01
Unknown
And so and so like within the world of science, um, it's like, it, like conservatism is like seeing science as something social. That's my understanding. Although I could be wrong, maybe, but I didn't look it up. But would make a lot of sense for, for me, for one thing. So yeah, I looked it up briefly earlier and I looked up so briefly that I could have maybe misread the short thing I, I saw about it.

01:02:51:03 - 01:03:22:23
Unknown
Um, but let's say, okay, so let's say we're wrong about that's what construction was a means. Um, I still think, like, this way of thinking about the sciences is aligned with what Goodman is putting forth here. Um, yeah. And yeah, so I yeah, I think this is, like, the idea of paradigm shifts to sort of just mention. KUHN And the philosophy of science is the idea that, like, science isn't so much like a linear arc of, of, of progress, of, like, like learning new facts of, like, just collecting new facts.

01:03:22:23 - 01:03:48:00
Unknown
Oh, we found a new fact that's added to the fact, but it's sort of facts out there in the world that's going on. Right? You have to go. Yeah. Collect them. Yeah. It's like Pokemon or something. Instead it's like. Like each new revolution in science displaces the old way of, like, thinking about the world and conceptualizing reality. And so relativity displaced the new, the Newtonian notion of physics completely.

01:03:48:02 - 01:04:21:03
Unknown
Um, and again, this is based on like validation, you know, like within the realm of, within the realm of the sciences, and sort of historically at a certain time, what methods they were using to validate, um, and yeah, like the, like what we take to be true or fact or like a way of thinking about things is sort of like, like socially conditioned, uh, and science evolves through, ah, like complete rethinking of like previous frameworks.

01:04:21:09 - 01:04:54:02
Unknown
Yeah, yeah, yeah. I think he, I think he gets into that like that very issue of science in the traditional supplementation section, which you don't necessarily have to dig into right now, the specific things. But yeah, I'm just saying that I like, from what I remember from that section, I think you're totally in line with. And I think another, I think another thing where signposting is with the art thing is that also with the with the idea of what is art, there's a whole chapter devoted to this, which I'm really excited for us to read later on, called When Is Art?

01:04:54:02 - 01:05:20:01
Unknown
When Is Art? And you can already start to think from that title, like the way that he's trolling with that. I love it. Yeah. So yeah, I'm really excited for it for us to touch on that. Um, but maybe we can. So yeah, I wonder if the, if the deletion and sublimation thing is that where you talk about what search group are you, you.

01:05:20:03 - 01:05:53:04
Unknown
I think I thought I was waiting, but maybe I'm wrong. Okay. Maybe he's in waiting. But it was. It would be nice too. Yeah. Oh no, no, no. Or he does. Yes, we did. We were waiting and he also talked about the previous section. Right, right, right. Yeah. Both. And I guess I'm like, Yeah. I'm wondering whether so GRU is grooming or something As grew if if examined before a given date and green.

01:05:53:06 - 01:06:37:17
Unknown
Wait, wait, wait, wait. Sorry. I meant maybe if you have a way to explain it. I'm trying to explain it. It's. We already have a way to explain it. You should go. Um, well, I can. I can give it a shot. Sure. Well, I mean, so, like, I'll. I'll. Emeralds are well, not element or not are not great if Oh agree with it's it's not that if something is GRU then it's because I mean it's that GRU means that something is examined before a given date is green and if it's not examined or if it's were or not examined by that day and blue or not.

01:06:37:17 - 01:07:03:01
Unknown
So exam, does that mean the conclusion of the examination? And that means that it was never looked at like it's just like, okay, sitting underground. Got it got into an emerald is okay so maybe there's a simpler version of that which first came up with the idea that diamonds are soft until you touch them and there's nothing like that's not you can never invalidate that empirically.

01:07:03:01 - 01:07:22:19
Unknown
Yeah. Yeah. And like, it's like, it's like, it's a kind of statement that. But am I being too petty here? But is it's a kind of statement that, like, it's like you can't prove this empirically, but it's also not in a political statement, right? Wait, no, no, no. It an empirical statement. It's just an empty one. Oh, okay.

01:07:22:20 - 01:07:48:05
Unknown
Okay. Yes. And that's that's the same. Yeah. I think through yeah, it's an empirical statement. It's just an empty one. It's not useful. And okay, here's actually the passage that I really that I really like that I wanted to talk about, which I think it's in that section. I lost the page now, um, what was it? Okay, It's okay.

01:07:48:07 - 01:08:24:18
Unknown
It's actually, it's actually in the, in the first section, and it's right before he talks about girl. Yeah. Um, repetition as well as identification is relative to organization. A world may be unmanageable, heterogeneous, or unbearably monotonous, according to how events are sorted into kinds. Whether or not today's experiment repeats yesterdays, however much the two events may differ depends on whether they test a common hypothesis, a shadow or a shadow shadow or a rat's.

01:08:24:18 - 01:09:00:00
Unknown
Yeah, our perception is off, which means our conception of yes. And that's literally what happened. I saw Shadow and I formed the image of a rat or a cockroach. Keep going. Yeah. Uh, whether or not today's experiment repeats yesterday's however much the two events may differ depends on whether they test a common hypothesis as surge or, as Thomas Thompson puts it, there will always be something different when it comes to when you say your pet, an experiment is that you're all the features of an experiment which a theory determines are relevant.

01:09:00:01 - 01:09:28:18
Unknown
In other words, you repeat the experiment as an example of the of the theory. And like, let me think if there's a good way of of like, of giving an example that well, you can think of your mind, but right after this. The music to music performances of the same score. That is a good idea. Yeah. Nevertheless, performances of the same work, if they conform to the same score.

01:09:28:20 - 01:09:51:18
Unknown
But you can think of your own example to. Yeah, but I think that yeah I think that's good in that like you're identifying sort of what features are relevant and using that to organize your world. And he goes from that basically. Yeah, things go on. Yeah. He sort of alludes to and sign, which is a very good reference if anyone knows it.

01:09:51:20 - 01:10:16:06
Unknown
Uh, induction requires taking some classes to the exclusion of others as relevant kinds only. So, for example, do our observations of emeralds exhibit any regularity and confirm that all emeralds are green, rather than that all are grew? Um, because I mean, the so like the grue thing, it comes from another text where he expands on it in much more detail.

01:10:16:08 - 01:10:37:09
Unknown
Um, and that's why I was sort of debating like, I think it's a very good point, but like, I don't know that text well enough to sort of articulate it well. But there's something to me about the idea of like you can, you can define your hypothesis in a way that it will always be right. Okay. And then you can say, look, I'm, I'm a genius.

01:10:37:09 - 01:11:05:06
Unknown
I'm coming up with all these correct hypotheses, but like, like they're not sort of like helping us, like, learn something new or predict things we didn't know. Know, basically. Yeah. So maybe this is like a maybe it's similar to technology's. Yeah, it's just always going to be true. Although maybe. Yeah, this is like my hypothesis. Hypotheses are true in and of themselves in the sense that like they don't allow themselves to be proven wrong.

01:11:05:06 - 01:11:27:16
Unknown
Empirically. Yes. So like my hypothesis is that every bachelor at me will be an unmarried and. Sure. Yeah. And like, like, look, all will meet different people, ask them, are you bachelor? I can see that you're a man. There you are at another take to the correct conclusion list. There's a lot of support behind this. I was is.

01:11:27:18 - 01:11:55:13
Unknown
But in a sense, the sort of common sense, uh, response to that is like, well, we haven't learned anything that's not sort of providing us with any, with any new knowledge. Yeah. And so we construct our hypotheses in such a way that they allow us to predict the unknown from the known and Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. The least interesting thing I actually want to go back to the start of the section you were reading.

01:11:55:15 - 01:12:18:21
Unknown
So, um, sorry, let me, let me read this real quick to see what I do, see if I can remember exactly what it was about this that I think, I was confused by. And I'm wondering if you, if you read it, if you, if you think you have a good reading of it. Um, see, sorry, I just want to.

01:12:18:21 - 01:13:21:12
Unknown
I want to see if I actually want to go back and start further back. But you're good. Oh, wait, no, there's actually of. Okay, Sorry. I think. I think this line is sort of getting my I'm not sure how to read this. So repetition. Well, as identification is relative to organization, just start that initial sentence. Like, how are you reading this?

01:13:21:12 - 01:13:51:12
Unknown
I'm not sure what to make of this. It's back to organization. Um, yeah. Okay. I think. Well, here's one sort of initial wave framing it. Yeah. Is that it relates to the sort of same. In what sense point? Um, so one thing is a repetition of another. Okay. According is like what our criteria for what the same, what is different.

01:13:51:14 - 01:14:27:04
Unknown
Um, oh, okay. Okay. Time. Yeah, yeah. And so yeah, so here he has this little parable that he tells later on about, um, like ordering, ordering a sample of the fabric. Um, and then, uh, uh, ordering like a sort of like a larger cut of that fabric or like, like, Yeah, Um, all right. I think maybe I'll use a different one, which is a little bit easier.

01:14:27:06 - 01:14:52:12
Unknown
Um, of like, uh, like tasting like, like getting one cake is a sample from a cake maker to see if you like the taste and then saying, like, I'll, I'll order, order more of this. And then the, the, the, the baker gives you one giant cake. Uh uh, and it's like, oh, you asked for more of this. So I gave you more of this, like, just all hours.

01:14:52:14 - 01:15:10:23
Unknown
Okay. Okay. Um, and then the counter that is the fabric example where want more fabric. And so then they send you a bunch of little, like, sample patches that are hooked up separately. Uh, and so, yeah, so, so the same, same request made. I want more. So you see a sample of fabric and you say you want more of that, right?

01:15:11:04 - 01:15:36:04
Unknown
And instead of giving you more of that same design in a larger scale, they give you more samples. This referring not to. Yeah, this referring to samples. Yeah. This referring to like a discrete sample versus in the cake. That's exactly what you want. Right. So, like, you want more cakes, right? Right. Yeah. And so like, I think this is also the again, the, the, the, the devious politician at play.

01:15:36:06 - 01:16:01:23
Unknown
What properties are relevant, what properties are irrelevant in saying like this is the same as that. Yeah. Like for example. Okay got because if I can Yeah. Just to make sure I'm understanding what you mean by that. Um, when you're saying what properties are relevant, what aren't relevant, this is a way of talking about what he means by organization here in the sentence he Yes.

01:16:02:00 - 01:16:25:20
Unknown
Um, like a organizational scheme that has come up with like what the section is, what composition? Decomposition, Right. Yeah. So the Okay, so in this context, do you think I'm right to read organization is talking about something like categorization something like yeah. Okay so like, what are the entities this world and what properties do they have? Right, Right.

01:16:26:01 - 01:16:47:04
Unknown
And what and do some entities belong to other entities, Right. Are there, are there categories that encompass smaller right. Yeah. Like here's, here's, here's where things get fuzzy because like, you can also think of it in terms of like a like a class in a subclass as a hierarchy. And yeah, that might be an order or it might be composition decomposition.

01:16:47:09 - 01:17:13:01
Unknown
And that's exactly the point that he makes later on that these are sort of like they're not meant to sort of be like exhaustive and, and like systematic. They're just these sort of various ways of describing this process. Yeah. You want an always siloed. Yeah yeah. Or like the the case with like which properties are relevant or irrelevant that might be weighting so like which which properties are relevant, which properties might be there or simply irrelevant.

01:17:13:03 - 01:17:40:13
Unknown
Um, or it might be composition. Just what entities and what properties do they have. Um, or it might be deletion all together. Like, like what, what properties of their, what properties or not. Yeah. Yeah. And I think yeah, I think it's about as, as uh, definite as I can be prepared to make of, of a judgment of what he means of organization.

01:17:40:16 - 01:18:07:08
Unknown
Okay. Here. Um, sorry if you remember what you were going to say after that, after I interrupted, but so I was talking about cakes, right? Cakes. The swath of fabric. Yeah. So then, I mean, in the case of. In the case of repetition. Yeah. Um, uh, but okay, so we can use the example of two musical performances. Mm hmm.

01:18:07:10 - 01:18:40:06
Unknown
Were they the same? Were they the same work? Well, they were played at different time, so they're not the same is one thing that someone might try sort of simplistically argue of. Like if you analyze the use according to the sort of leibniz's definition of identity, which is that uh, that they share all the same properties. Okay then like, like, then they're, then they're, it's like a qualitative identity is another way to talk about this or.

01:18:40:08 - 01:19:17:01
Unknown
Yeah, um, as opposed to complete identity. There's a, there's a role of because it would, it would encompass numerical identity to, um, living is role of identity, love, identity, love of indiscernible as there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. So if, if two objects have all the same properties, then they're just the same object.

01:19:17:03 - 01:19:41:03
Unknown
And those and and what counts as a property could mean location. I think. Well this is, this is where a kind of like libraries are full of shit. Okay. There's like, there's like oh, there's two great two raindrops that are exactly the same, except in their, in their position. And I think Leibniz sort of overlooks position. Okay. That might be that might be like you have to fact check me on that.

01:19:41:05 - 01:20:02:10
Unknown
I'm not sure that's my vague recollection of like a passage in the critique of purism. Okay. But I think if like, I think client is basically holding libraries to be completely thorough in his law of identity, which would include which would include things like position, things like sort of like life time of occurrence. Yeah, yeah. Things like composition, right.

01:20:02:12 - 01:20:27:10
Unknown
Like what any anything which could be considered as a quality. Right, Right. Like things have to have everything in common in order to be the same. Um, that's the lot of indiscernible. Okay. Um, but yeah, and so, so, okay. So the two performances you were saying, are they the same work? Well, they didn't happen at the same time, so they're not.

01:20:27:12 - 01:21:06:04
Unknown
And then, so what we're going is I'm not for the. Yeah. Like obviously I'm not, I'm not saying that. Oh yeah. You're saying someone might argue that someone might argue that um, given the fact that they have these two properties that are, that are distinct or more easily that they're played in very ways or played so differently as to be sort of unrecognizable, then like maybe that's more plausible that you'd argue that they're considered different work, but it's just this point that in deciding when to performances are of the same work, there are certain criteria for like like what counts as the same work.

01:21:06:06 - 01:21:27:11
Unknown
Yeah, yeah. And they may like I think that's that's the task that a philosopher could and I'm sure has sort of tried to pin down what are the exact criteria under which we would consider a work produce or two performances of the same work to be of the same work or to be of different works and yeah, all right.

01:21:27:11 - 01:21:55:01
Unknown
Like, like one philosopher might say, it's predicated on the intention of the performer, for example, an intention to perform from the same score. Yeah, intention from. And that's a very sort of liberal because there might be just like a child who doesn't know the piano is like, I'm playing Mozart and then, you know, like we could like, except that if we don't and if we don't accept it, it just means we have to be more maybe more specific with how we describe intention or something.

01:21:55:03 - 01:22:17:16
Unknown
Well, I think like we might just not accept that as a valid criteria for for what counts as the same one in the face of this example of a child trying to do it. Yeah. Or in the case even of like an avant garde performer who says he's going to play like so-and-so composition and then play something else and then claims that it's still the same composition, making some statement or.

01:22:17:16 - 01:22:58:09
Unknown
Yeah, right. Or in the case of Marcel Duchamp, putting forward the fountain as an artwork, that's a, that's also a case like similarly is this art. It's the same sort of question of what are the, what are the relevant property. Yeah. Um, like what is the relevant criteria? And again, that's similar to the covariant question. Um, you know, like, like, like we have, we have certain habits and orientations which incline us to sort of recognize things as members of a category, and then we might encounter something that forces us, forces us to revise our sort of stated criteria for what comprises that category.

01:22:58:11 - 01:23:22:20
Unknown
Um, yeah, like the example that, that Kabbalah thing um, gives is like, oh, you've only seen white swans your entire life and you might think it's a, it's important as a property of swans that they may be white. And then you're encountered with the black swan and you have to sort of revise your conceptualization of swans as something broader than just, uh, than just white.

01:23:22:22 - 01:23:55:11
Unknown
So how much of this is a social thing then, that like, you have to do that because there are other people who like prior to you encountering this that's just accepted as a black swan right now, like everyone else agrees that, this is a black swan as opposed to it should just be given a completely different name. What if, like upon the initial discovery of a black what we call a black swan now, um, people were like, This looks exactly like a swan, but it's black, so it's not a swan.

01:23:55:11 - 01:24:20:24
Unknown
Let's call it something else. Um, this is, well, I mean there are probably, there are obviously other things, obviously from like a zoologist perspective or biological perspective, like how much does DNA make the genetic make up? I think there are probably cases similar taxonomy of like originally two species which were then discovered to be like subspecies. But then this is this is kind of a social thing, right?

01:24:21:00 - 01:24:44:08
Unknown
It's still a social thing. It just gets a lot more complicated than me and you sitting here pretending we've just discovered the first black swan. Yeah. Historically, I think. I think part of it is like part of it is shared convention and yeah, part of it is interfacing with the world though. Oh absolutely. Yeah. Yeah. Because I think in the case of science, it's not just we're like, yeah, people iteratively saying things and then deciding to say different things.

01:24:44:08 - 01:25:16:21
Unknown
Yeah, part of it is about it's social, it's about shared practices and it's about like shared like, Yeah, forms of like speaking and understanding things. And then part of it is a demand for validation outside of those, right? Speaking or in other ways of speaking. Right. Um, so like the, the, all the knowledge that a doctor has of medicine and of the body, they can bring that to bear on the way that we feel and the way that we experience the world in our sort of ordinary conceptions of like I feel pain in this area.

01:25:16:23 - 01:25:37:01
Unknown
Oh that's because we have bleeding so and so. Um, and so like, yeah, like, like experts can sort of, like one way. Yeah, like one way to validate our knowledge is to sort of like, bring it into another domain and showing how it can be relevant. Um, yeah. And so yeah, there's this sense of interfacing with the world.

01:25:37:03 - 01:26:03:13
Unknown
Um And I guess the one caveat that, that we have to be careful of is it's not interfacing with the world outside of language like some of the world that's being measured up to, right. It's always just other worlds Yeah. Like one like the world of science is validated by the fact that when I take an aspirin, my pain goes away by the fact I can fly to California in a matter of hours and, like, do that safely.

01:26:03:13 - 01:26:35:14
Unknown
And people do that every day, like in these various domains of experience and and conversation. One like different worlds are validated in other worlds. Um, so okay, forgive me if this is kind of like, maybe like too much of, like a devil's advocate, but then, um, uh, like what, what were the first worlds? Okay, so I'm saying, like, give me an, as an answer, sort of.

01:26:35:15 - 01:27:06:09
Unknown
I think that he sort of doesn't have an answer because he's like, Oh, but, um, he's, he does say something about, uh, yeah, he sort of, I think he, he acknowledges that that's where you're, that's what your question would be. And he says, like, that's an important question. Oh, here it is. Okay. Um, the many stuffs matter energy, waves, phenomena the worlds are made of along with are made that worlds are of are made along with the world.

01:27:06:15 - 01:27:33:01
Unknown
But made from what? Not from nothing after all, but from other worlds world making as we know it always starts from worlds already on hand. The making is remaking. Anthropology and developmental psychology may study social and individual histories of such world making, but the search for a universal or necessary beginning is best left at the, uh uh. And he does have like a little footnote to it.

01:27:33:03 - 01:27:52:17
Unknown
Yeah a reference to his construction of a history of successive development of worlds to involve application of something like a content relative regulative principle. And the search for a First World does to be as misguided for this as a search for a first moment of time. Um, which, like, I don't know exactly what he's referring to with punching, right?

01:27:52:19 - 01:28:17:13
Unknown
Regulative principle. Sure. Um, but yeah, the idea of like a first moment in time, it's like to ask, what is the first moment in time? It's like it's a question that as you speak, it doesn't make sense, um, because you're already in time. If you're asking, what's the first moment in time? Well, so the beginning of time, it's like it, it, it ceases to make sense when you ask that question, which are why?

01:28:17:15 - 01:28:38:11
Unknown
Because like, in order for it to make sense, to ask what is the beginning of time, time must have already had to be going. Yeah, well, that just means that time precedes conception of the existence of time. We can. Okay. Yeah. You know what I was about to say, right? I think. I don't know what time time precedes.

01:28:38:13 - 01:29:07:14
Unknown
Time must exist before we can conceive of time, but we're talking about time. Is that. Yes. Yeah. Okay, Get in the act. But. Okay, well, okay. But I don't know, maybe this is just a feature or a like an an and inevitability of language, and we just have to accept it. Um, I, I think like, well, I think okay, maybe to be a little bit less sort of facetious in answering that question, you know, you can give sort of anthropological frameworks for it.

01:29:07:14 - 01:29:39:01
Unknown
Yeah. Um, that like worlds are this sort of cultural development that occurred with, with the development of people and their sort of shared practices, practices and forms of life or, or, or it starts with shared language and arts and arts or whatever or even like I think is yeah. Or anything is like original or one of his points of like perception itself constitutes a world of just like way in which we experience and identify things.

01:29:39:07 - 01:29:56:21
Unknown
Um, like yeah, just in sort of our experience, like, even, like outside of language, like, I think he does have a wish, although it gets really difficult because so much of this is sort of like it's a philosophy which is very much entrenched in, in language and forms of language. Um, but he doesn't want it to be limited to language.

01:29:56:22 - 01:30:26:11
Unknown
He wants me to be asking it to be a perception of it's perception of that perception itself. Yeah. Um, but is there it could there ever, could there have been what we call art if there was never language to begin with? Um, like, do when we are talking about art, do we accept termite mounds as art? Um, um, because I think generally we don't accept that termites have language, least not human language.

01:30:26:13 - 01:31:05:23
Unknown
Um, I don't know, someone like Chomsky would say that they can maybe, maybe that they can communicate, but they don't have language. I mean, I don't know if he would use that language exactly, but I think in the case of the Terminator two lies of a question about language and more of a question about intention, um, of like we wouldn't consider what the termites are doing as our because it's not the design of an individual or maybe it's just sort of the blind construction, I think at least speaking from a sort of very everyday way of thinking, it's like, uh, like these are just these blind entities that are sort of moving grains of sand

01:31:05:23 - 01:31:40:23
Unknown
into a certain shape. Um, yeah. And like, yeah, like, like, do you consider that line physical process or like to use an even more upfront like Iraq, which has a funny like pretty shape or something? So we consider that uh, an art, uh, and like, is this there is this kind of like nature's beauty or like, like, I think it's often there's, this often leads people to this sort of teleological conception of the world of like God's creation, for example, uh, and that is one way of, one way of like thinking about the natural world as, like art forms and as something.

01:31:40:23 - 01:32:20:21
Unknown
Yeah, I'm familiar with that language. Um, yeah, so, so yeah, like, I think, like, I think in, like those cases are less about, um, like language per se, so much as just like the sort of like intention action that we associate with, with art and acts of art. Um hmm. But I do wonder if there is something to your point of like, uh, of art being in some way connected to the development of language.

01:32:20:23 - 01:32:59:05
Unknown
Know, I think like, for example, like, oh yeah. Um. Cavell, Cavell will, uh, like tend to think of, uh, of, uh, uh, an artwork as a kind like, like a form of speech. Um, yeah, it is art as like, yeah, forms of speech anchored in, in various conventions in which they're understood to be interpreted properly. Um, so there is this way in which like we are communicating through, through artwork, and in that way they feel very connected.

01:32:59:07 - 01:33:16:21
Unknown
Um, and I'm not sure I feel like because I feel like there were like before written language or yeah, actually, I mean, well, actually maybe this is my problem with like, like we may have written language in like, what is it like in Babylon or. Yeah, Mesopotamia, I think is the origin of this person, you know, as far as we know, yeah.

01:33:16:22 - 01:33:34:08
Unknown
Um, and of course there were still like totems and artworks before that point, before a verbal language. I don't know. I think to some extent that is really a, a neurological or anthropological question of like, like what are the sort of I maybe, maybe not of like sort of what are the shared capacities between these two forms of behavior.

01:33:34:08 - 01:34:08:09
Unknown
But I think there is a way in which they can be seen as very similar or or as involving many of the same constraints. And yeah, so maybe One World is the sort of like Einsteinian, like everything is a form like, uh, like forms of life are predicated on and like languages and language games. Yeah. Um, and so seeing language as this very expansive thing outside of things that you would normally consider as language or yeah, like acts on sort of like with the attention of others can often be sort of considered like forms of speech.

01:34:08:11 - 01:34:34:02
Unknown
Uh, some of the attention, yeah. Like, like with the intent of sort of like, like being perceived by others. Okay. Okay, okay, okay. But then also, like, art can also not be that I feel like because sometimes, I mean, even when I'm, when I'm producing art, I have this sense of like, I just have this, I have this, like, vision of a world which I want to bring into being or this experience that I want to have.

01:34:34:04 - 01:35:09:15
Unknown
And so I want to sort of fabricate something that will generate that experience. Um, and that's like, like, I think it's cool to sort of share that with other people, but it's not necessarily my primary, like my primary aim can often be, and I think it is for many artists, like very tactile and very, yeah, sort of focus on the sort of individual engagement, um, like that you get from the, from the materials and the process and the things that you create or like they get the feeling of wanting to be swept up in the things that you create, um, so yeah, I don't know, like maybe, maybe not necessarily.

01:35:09:17 - 01:35:41:00
Unknown
Yeah, yeah, yeah. So, so Art can be, can be kind of a self, a process of like, self-exploration, self-expression for oneself. Um, although self conversation in some ways which yes, realize you're working with and here's, here's another caveat to to put upon it that like we have, we may have these modes of doing our work that we don't plan to showed anyone else.

01:35:41:02 - 01:36:02:18
Unknown
But I think the very Vik and standing in line here would be like we're already doing these practices according to these norms of like making work that we've that we've learned from the society that we're embedded. Yeah, that's very true. Um, you know, like we're inclined to make work in certain ways and conceive of the act of doing our work, even if we don't plan to show it to anyone.

01:36:02:18 - 01:36:43:00
Unknown
Yeah. Uh, through these, through these models of, of, of language and this concept of art that we've learned from, you know, our sort of shared loss of thinking. Yeah, Um, yeah, I think. Sorry if I can maybe go, like, connected to art, but not exactly this, this line of thinking about art now, and maybe this connects back to Goodman or that back to still to Goodman Art as a thinking of art as a kind of, uh, let's see, maybe it maybe I can even just borrow his language.

01:36:43:02 - 01:36:46:08
Unknown
I have a freedom.

01:36:46:10 - 01:37:26:13
Unknown
So he talks about how, like, art doesn't have truth value, right? Or or actually humanizing art. He might have said, like, a depiction doesn't have true or something like that. Exactly. Where that it's on. It's on three. Uh, so even with all illusory or wrong or dubious versions dropped, the rest exhibit new dimensions of disparity. We here, we have no frames of reference, no ready rules for transforming physics, biology and psychology into one another, and no way at all of transforming any of these into Van Gogh's Vision or Vanga Van Gogh's into Canaletto.

01:37:26:13 - 01:37:50:19
Unknown
As such of these virgins are as are depictions rather than descriptions have no truth value in the literal sense and cannot be combined by conjunction. I was thinking of a different okay, you would think so. If I can just try to find that, you know. Yeah. I think it might have been in the the fifth section in trouble with truth.

01:37:50:21 - 01:38:27:02
Unknown
I think, um, what is it? Is I think it might have been near the section where the point where he talks about like not even talking about things as true or false but. Right. And Wrong. Yeah. Um, for non-verbal versions and even for verbal versions without statements, truth is irrelevant. We risk confusion when we speak of pictures predicates as true of what they depict or reply to.

01:38:27:04 - 01:38:47:16
Unknown
They have no truth value they may represent or to note some things and not others. While the statement does have true value, it's true of everything. If of anything. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's the, that's the section of. Yeah, yeah. Um, so yeah, I don't know if, I don't know if you're interested to talk about this, but.

01:38:47:19 - 01:39:26:07
Unknown
Oh, this idea of like, like he's making some distinction here. Um, like there are things which we can assign truth value to. There are things which we can't. So it seems like he's he's kind of. He's kind of doing a if I can borrow it, he's kind of doing a composition decomposition here with his own framework of worlds making right now within within worlds, there are such things that can have true values and there are such things that can yeah, that that don't they can be said to be true or false.

01:39:26:07 - 01:40:05:01
Unknown
Yeah and I think he's not I think he's, I think this is very much I mean it's, it's, it's very socially anchored. Um, it's about like what we expect of these different practices. Um So like kind of statements. Yeah. Um, like, like the shared information on statements is what is he saying? Um, they have to be true of everything and if anything, um, whereas it doesn't even really make sense to say a picture is true, like in, in, in our everyday way of speaking like that doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

01:40:05:01 - 01:40:28:10
Unknown
You have to sort of elaborate it on it in a certain sense. Um, and like what you might be saying there is like is, is like, is what it will actually, Yeah. Like what even in what sense, like is what it's picturing. Um, like, like, like for example, it's a picture of a horse. Ah, the, like, like physical proportions of the horse.

01:40:28:11 - 01:40:52:11
Unknown
Correct. Um, they may be, it may be not a real horse though. Um, yeah, or it may be a real horse, but like, drawn according to cubism, um, and so, like, it's not in either of these cases, it may not be like, invalidate it because you can say that the one is accurate in a certain way and, the other is accurate in a different way.

01:40:52:13 - 01:41:22:06
Unknown
I think that's what he's saying. Yeah. Although I think he's also maybe, maybe you are just saying this and I'm like trying to articulate it differently. But I say what I think he's saying here, not necessarily a contradiction to you, is that like we shouldn't even talk about art, pictures, imagery as as a kind of thing that intends to make a claim about something.

01:41:22:06 - 01:41:52:00
Unknown
Yeah. Um, so I mean, we sometimes use imagery that we say in, within journalism, for example, you might use a photograph of, uh, it's like a snapshot of what is that? Right, Right. Like, see, like, I'll prove it to you with this picture. Yeah, the picture is here to prove that, like, it's true that these three people were in the middle of the crosswalk at 2 p.m. m whatever.

01:41:52:01 - 01:42:30:21
Unknown
I don't know. The CCTV shows us whatever right, But. But in that sense, the picture is still not making a claim. It's being used to make a claim, right? Yeah. I like. I think yeah. It's all about like and this is photography, which is a little bit different than painting. Well, maybe not just a little bit different, but I think it's like, yeah, it's all about like the context in which it's sort of like situated, um, like, yeah, there are certain expectations of the pictures that we see in the newspaper versus, the ones that we see in a gallery, and we expect them to be sort of speaking in different ways.

01:42:30:23 - 01:43:00:03
Unknown
Um, but yeah, like not in any case, not claiming. Um. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Hmm. So, like, for example. Well, okay, how do we, how might this, how might this inform how we see art? Um, in I'm asking this question not, not in the sense that, like, I'm trying to get to the interpreter from here, but we're like how we applied that messaging.

01:43:00:03 - 01:43:26:19
Unknown
But in answering this question, how might this inform how we see art? Maybe we can get a better understanding of what they're saying. Yeah. So like the other thing that he talks about often is, um, yeah, maybe to sort of like look at like this is a um, like there is a quality even in language, like novels are in one sense false if they're sort of taken literally.

01:43:26:19 - 01:43:59:11
Unknown
Yeah. But they can be sort of figuratively true and in different ways or like have like, like real messages and yeah, it's like, uh, I don't know, maybe you may. I will bring that in now. Let's stick with pictures for the moment, but yeah, um, um so, okay, okay. Let's just say, like, a portrait of some serious person of.

01:43:59:13 - 01:44:33:09
Unknown
Uh, or Okay, let's say this, like, a self-portrait photograph. So I'm not even painting where, like, we we can get into the weeds of over the details are also they're not accurately representing what someone so truly looks like or something, but someone takes a self-portrait. Um. Let's say I take a self-portrait. Know, like the my my point of taking a self-portrait as an artist isn't to show the world this is what I truly look like from this very specific angle.

01:44:33:09 - 01:44:57:19
Unknown
If I give you the mass of like, this is a lens, I use, a camera I use. That's how many millimeters the film was so that you can kind of frame like, This is why this photo looks this way of me. Um, you know, to give a frame of reference, it's like the point isn't to show you this is exactly what I look like, because then we can get into, like, the lighting and, you know, like what someone looks like is dependent upon still the context of lighting and everything.

01:44:57:19 - 01:45:25:03
Unknown
Right. Um, the point is to make some other kind of statement about myself. And so, like, the photo itself doesn't like to use this. This language of truth value is maybe not just wrong, but completely like missing the point of, of what that work itself. Yeah. Is intending to do or what it actually does, I don't know. But no, no, no.

01:45:25:04 - 01:45:46:20
Unknown
Okay. So if we allow the work to speak for itself, then. Then then it is valid to say things like this photo accurately or it doesn't accurately represent. Yeah. Looks like representing. Um. Yeah. Or like, you know, like, like an artist might say like, I want to show like my true self or something or like, bring out this true feature, right?

01:45:46:21 - 01:46:14:11
Unknown
And you know, to talk about like the portrait, a Portrait of Jesus by, um, for the Tortoise, one of the famous Dutch people need to serve in our Rembrandt. Rembrandt. And I can't remember who else. And yeah, I made my theory there, although I'm not familiar with things like artworks. I know how Rembrandt paints, and it's like an extremely detailed and, like, non idealistic way.

01:46:14:13 - 01:46:39:13
Unknown
Yeah, And that's our specialness. Yeah. Yeah. That's like the Dutch school of painting is to do it that way and to focus on realism and like, physical realism. And then there's a sort of ideal school of like to sort of remove blemishes and like, yeah, make the lighting really good and make everything look sort of beautiful and, and yeah, like sort of deform certain features physically in a way which sort of better convey the idea of an individual.

01:46:39:15 - 01:47:07:20
Unknown
Um, and so these, these, these, um, like, uh, yeah, they're like different ways of using symbols, right? Yeah. Or differently. There's like the Dutch, like Rembrandt is still being symbolic. You can imagine things in a scene that don't, didn't say it, actually. Well, Jesus, he didn't live at the time of Jesus for example, so. But anyway, sorry I interrupted, but yeah, I think yeah.

01:47:07:20 - 01:47:35:13
Unknown
Because I think what I was realizing that they're talking is like like I'm still sort of hinging on the representation. Um, and government doesn't even want to do that because he goes on to say a non representational picture such as a mondrian says nothing denotes nothing, pictures, nothing, and is neither true nor false, but shows much. Yeah. So, okay, so here's the thing.

01:47:35:13 - 01:48:00:05
Unknown
And again, I think this is something that we'll get into in the one is our chapter in a lot of detail. Um, but one thing they talked about sort of mentions briefly here is this idea that, um, an abstract painting exemplifies its own properties. So it's still symbolic. It's not symbolic in the way that representational work is representational work pictures.

01:48:00:05 - 01:48:25:09
Unknown
It points to a thing that it's sort of symbolizing and that's, um, yeah, it's like referencing something. And in what way do we know that it's referencing something? It's not in some sort of like metaphysical way. It's just sort of how we're inclined to interpret this painting on sort of and conventions and like forms of perception. We can tell that's a representational painting says that's an abstract painting.

01:48:25:11 - 01:48:49:16
Unknown
So I had to try and like him as that is like there's no sort of ideal abstract or representational forms of work. Yeah. Um, and then, but in the case of an abstract painting taken as such, it's sort of pointing to its own properties and saying, Look at these properties, take special note of these properties. Um, and then there's this beautiful line.

01:48:49:16 - 01:49:16:17
Unknown
I can't remember if it's in this chapter for another chapter or it's like you, you come away from a gallery of Mondrian paintings and you're looking out at the world and you're seeing the landscapes and, and this your physical surroundings in terms of like lots of line and color. So it's sort of transforms the way in and in some sort of soft way, it transforms how you're sort of experiencing the world after you go through and.

01:49:16:17 - 01:49:37:08
Unknown
It's not because Mondrian is is sort of telling you like this is what the world looks like. It's saying just take special note of these properties of wine and stroke. Um, and then you go into the road and you do, you sort of, you're paying more attention to the ways that color in line pop out. And then now this is what the world looks like.

01:49:37:10 - 01:50:06:22
Unknown
Yeah, in some sense, except that you're the world looks like that because you're seeing the world now in light of the Mondrian painting, but not because the Mondrian painting was was trying to represent what the world looks like. Yeah. Yeah. So it, it that it makes its performing world making assets without any form of representation. Yeah. It's just, it's just emphasizing itself.

01:50:06:24 - 01:50:28:21
Unknown
Yeah. But I think here's Yeah. But one thing for Goodman the one the reduction here, the sort of composition is all these sort of subcomponents of any kind of painting as well as any kind of description is that they're all forms of symbolism, they're all manipulation of signs and symbols. Yeah. And that's going to be true of all of them.

01:50:28:23 - 01:50:55:18
Unknown
And they're just the mechanics are going to be different in different cases. And that there is no sort of absolute like this is a sign of this kind of another kind. There's just this sign is interpreted in a certain way in this context. Yeah, I think I think another way to read Goodman here is that he's just saying that a picture is a suspect, a picture or just a painting to sequence that medium.

01:50:55:18 - 01:51:28:21
Unknown
Maybe a painting is it's just a painting. And paintings don't produce world language. So you can say that the statement, this painting accurately represents what so-and-so looks like. This portrait accurately represents what so-and-so looked like. And that statement about the painting has a truth value. Now we're in the realms of words, right? Um, or language or whatever. But the painting itself, it's just a painting.

01:51:29:00 - 01:51:47:13
Unknown
Like it? Yeah, It's like literally just an image. Yeah. Like. Like even the act of, like, putting forth a painting. I don't know. They would necessarily say like this. There is a statement you can make about the painting of, like, it's accurately representing in this or that way. And those statements have truth value. Yeah, but those statements are not the same as the painting.

01:51:47:13 - 01:52:10:18
Unknown
No, they're not. The painting is the painting. And the painting just sort of roughly without specifying any particular part of it, references. Right, Right. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. References something. And then when we then we can start making statements about how accurately it represents the visual representation it represents or any other kind of representation. Right, right, right, exactly.

01:52:10:18 - 01:52:36:21
Unknown
Yeah. Yeah, yeah. It's another thing that I took note of this. We're talking about this. Yeah. That related to an earlier thing we're talking about. I think there's just this interesting, the pluralism versus modernism thing is such a fascinating point because what I just remembered is that he's not just hinging on the world as his language here versions is.

01:52:36:21 - 01:53:05:13
Unknown
The other thing that he that he sort of plays with throughout. So versions of the same world or many worlds, uh, it's sort of playing with this many one, many, one. Like, are they just many sort of like mutual exclusive worlds or are they just various versions of the same world? In some sense, what he's saying is that's not an important question or it's a it's a moot question.

01:53:05:13 - 01:53:31:17
Unknown
The question of whether it's better to describe this as versions of the same world or many worlds. Me Think about that. I think point is like I think my point is like, I don't think he thinks that's important. And yeah, there's just I think he doesn't think they're important or does he think that they're just different ways of talking about the same way?

01:53:31:19 - 01:54:05:11
Unknown
I think he thinks both are valid. Yeah. Um, and resolving them or consolidating them is like for his purposes, really that important? They're just both like, functionally speaking. Um, and that goes back to the James thing. Um, of like, uh, yeah, between modernism and pluralism tends to evaporate under analysis. If there's one world that embraces a multiplicity of contrasting aspects, if there are many worlds collection them all is one.

01:54:05:13 - 01:54:58:23
Unknown
Uh, so you can say like the world is all made of one, like one thing, um, but the one thing like, like, differs in its modes in such a way that produces this sort of, like, varied experience. Yeah. Um, yeah, of that same one thing. Yeah, yeah. Um, yeah, like, I don't know, like, I think that's, that's sort of different because that's like aspects of a world which may either may be taken together or as separate, like separate substances, but sorry, what you mean like I, my inference what James is talking about is like, is like modernism versus to it like substances which are like components of like an overall reality.

01:54:59:04 - 01:56:04:20
Unknown
Like either there are two of them and they're really different in nature or there's one which can be very is. And that's different from Goodman because Goodman is that saying the different worlds are like different components necessarily, Like they are completely exhaustive and they are contradicting with each other. Um, and he's saying that they can coexist. So do you think Goodman is making a kind of metaphysical statement here or or at least a statement about metaphysics which might be that for his purposes, when it comes to making valid claims about reality, it doesn't matter what metaphysical stance you start with, because the and the truth or the import or the validity of any statement we

01:56:04:20 - 01:56:34:17
Unknown
make or any or the what would what would be the right words for art. The, uh, what does he say? It's right for artworks. It's a truth. Truth is something which is always something we were assigned to. Statements, but of rightness. Yeah. Rightness of of things. Of things we depict or denote with imagery. These are confined to the worlds that they belong to.

01:56:34:17 - 01:57:02:14
Unknown
Yeah. Or the worlds or the frameworks of our that we're swimming in our discussion. When whenever we do make claims about things, it would would do. Do you think he's getting at something like that? It does it like so maybe he's a pluralist in the sense that like modernists and dualist and pluralist can all have meaningful conceptual discussions about quote unquote the world because because actually it doesn't matter what what's at the bottom of everything, right?

01:57:02:14 - 01:57:21:03
Unknown
We should be able to see in light of each other systems of thinking and etc., etc.. I think it's interesting because it's both it's both metaphysical and anti metaphysical. Yeah. Yeah. In that it's like, okay, the Prague to bring it to pragmatism here. Okay. Since he's talking the dream. So it's not like I'm coming out of nowhere. It's like with Jim James's famous they give a reason.

01:57:21:03 - 01:57:48:17
Unknown
You can say that ideas are tools. Yeah, ideas are tools which help us like, better adapt to our experience and interface with experience and sort of make sense of our world and our surroundings and act better. Um, and in that sense, better. Right? And whatever, whatever tool that that does, the job is, is fine and we should believe in that tool is that's, that's.

01:57:48:17 - 01:58:15:21
Unknown
James funny a little job and I think good men in taking the same job is like there is like something which there's a tension in that like like like the sort of the sort of like rather like the, the forbidden fruit of Taoism. I don't know what is the right, it's like there's, like the, it's like the thing that pragmatism lets you do you like, which really you feel like you shouldn't be able to do.

01:58:15:21 - 01:58:38:13
Unknown
But what you can do is accept things which are mutually exclusive with each other, and I believe things which are mutually exclusive with each other. Because in some examples I um, well, like thinking the world as like collections of particles and thinking the world as people moving around and, and having relations with each other I think with intentions.

01:58:38:17 - 01:59:06:09
Unknown
Yeah. So you can accept these contradictory models of reality insofar as they are relevant to you in different contexts, and you can drop them and pick them up whenever you need to. And the idea that belief is just this sort of like very, um, like flexible thing that you can just sort of like, like, like where you need it in in particular in certain instances according to what is relevant.

01:59:06:11 - 01:59:30:10
Unknown
Like there's something that feels wrong about like belief is not conditioned by what I want. Belief what is there? Uh huh uh, sure. And, and uh uh. I think Goodman is, is trying to like, bring us around a justification that like, like what the what is there? Like we can never like either we can never access that or it's a fantasy.

01:59:30:12 - 01:59:57:11
Unknown
Um, like, all that matters is the tools, um, and, and their, their relevance in different contexts. Do you think he's content here? Maybe. And in terms of like the idea of numinous, Yeah. Phenomena. Okay. Like, like, say let's for the sake of argument, say there is like Numenera, but there's no way to meaningfully talk about that to verify.

01:59:57:11 - 02:00:22:06
Unknown
We talk about that too confidently, to really talk about etc. like choose your language. Not only that, but, uh, in any way, like, in any way that we are, we will possibly experience numenor It will be through our concepts. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's phenomena. Yeah. So it's, it's irrelevant. The numenor like, yeah, it's only going to interface with those through that through phenomenon.

02:00:22:06 - 02:00:49:18
Unknown
So it's not like we're walking around blind is that the entire world is conditioned through our understanding. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So maybe, maybe this is the Rhydian thing. The there's nothing outside the text. I think that's kind of what Derrida was getting at. Sorry. Now we're ready to bring in more. Now, you started with pragmatism. Okay, so now that we don't have to go to too much further after this, but unless you want to.

02:00:49:20 - 02:01:14:08
Unknown
But my understanding of like the or at least maybe one way of reading Derrida when he talks about there's nothing outside the text is that like, you know what? I actually haven't really read it myself. And I'm trying to reconstruct right now very articulate a like commentary of what he said. And I'm still having trouble doing that. So maybe I won't even go to Dari.

02:01:14:08 - 02:01:38:16
Unknown
Let's just say that it's like, uh, there's no, um, I think maybe think of as the limits of my language or the limits of my work. Yeah, something like that. Yeah Yeah, yeah, yeah, like that. I and yeah, yeah. This idea of the limits of. Of my language or my world, I thought it's the other way. The limits of my world.

02:01:38:16 - 02:01:58:02
Unknown
It limits my language. I'm not sure. Uh, well, let's think about it, too. Both things have to, um, uh, limits of my world. And they want to know what the limits of my world or less of my language would be. That that one should be our wolf's idea. Maybe. Which is. I don't know how great that is. Well.

02:01:58:05 - 02:02:21:20
Unknown
Well, actually, it's. Oh, yeah, that's. That's what are you trying to say? But like. Yeah, I've been looking up recently and apparently there's been some reconsideration of it in, in linguistics more recently. Uh, okay. Uh, I think the, the problem, the limits of my language mean the limits of my world is the way. Okay, okay. This is coming from who again?

02:02:21:22 - 02:02:45:04
Unknown
This is Dickinson. Dickinson. Oh, okay. This is contained in the tractatus. So different, vague in stone from the investigations, but which ones? Leader Investigations characterizes this first one. And what was the mean? What was the big or big moves or differences between earlier and later? The consent? I forgot, um. Well, the tractatus is largely a correspondence theory of language.

02:02:45:04 - 02:03:15:09
Unknown
Okay. Um, and the investigations in some way try to move past that, trying to move past the sort of essential position of language as the sort of fabric as like constructing the fabric of reality into like thinking of language and this sort of social and communal as just like language, shared ways of speaking, um, and languages and sort of like very flexible and dynamic, saying that like there's no reason for us to like, try to pin it down like a butterfly.

02:03:15:14 - 02:03:49:11
Unknown
Mm hmm. Okay. Yeah, Yeah. Um, yeah, maybe. Let's, let's, let's try not to go any further, of course, than that. But I think yeah, the question of like, is that what Goodman is saying, that, um, because there is Goodman does have his own, uh, was it already in passage or that there's nothing outside the outside the text and, and Finkelstein's limited my language limits my world like statement in when he says, um, I like our universe, so to speak can sit here.

02:03:49:11 - 02:04:27:18
Unknown
I'll start in the sense before, uh, like, uh, but the words or the words of, um, we are confined to describing whatever describes our universe, so to speak, consists of these ways rather than of a world or of worlds. Um, so, like, the world only exists in so far as we describe it. And I think that's where like, like he is very much influenced by this tradition of philosophy, of language.

02:04:27:21 - 02:04:46:24
Unknown
Yeah. But I think he is trying to sort of move outside of a it's out of its confinement in the way that he talks about painting, in the way that he talks about perception, like it's supposed to be more exhaustive in some way, like language and description isn't the only way, or even maybe the main way in which we validated.

02:04:47:01 - 02:05:29:19
Unknown
Um, uh, validate our sort of beliefs and, and understanding, um, validate our conceptualizations of the world. Um, yeah. So it's not solely confined. Um, it's difficult. Yeah, there's a nuanced I feel like I'm, I'm missing same and I think, I think honestly, that's the kind of nuance that needs like an essay to back off. Yeah. Yeah. Um, which maybe, honestly, maybe like, like one thing you could do for your essay.

02:05:29:20 - 02:05:55:16
Unknown
Like, I don't. I don't want to say, like, like, tackle that question and try to, like, comprehend. Give me a, give you a couple of years and I'll do it. Yeah. Um, but we applied to a program first. I mean, I feel like it could be a dissertation. Yeah. Yeah. Maybe what you could do is, uh, like, look at the, like, the Derrida passage, like, where it comes from, and look at the Viking, the same passage.

02:05:55:18 - 02:06:18:00
Unknown
Oh, and see if there's a connection I can draw. Yeah. Or like, you can compare and contrast. Okay. Or use one as a lens to talk about some, some of the others or even got them in. Let me write that idea down. That's Yeah. I think that's I think that's a way I like that suggestion. Um and you can make connected disappear Wolf too.

02:06:18:02 - 02:06:49:23
Unknown
Yeah. Dangerous territory which maybe me honestly for a later for a later interview, we could have one of your linguistics buddies. Yeah, maybe. Yeah. Yeah. A customer. Yeah. Or so. Yeah. Yeah. Well, look at what is it? Limits of my language mean the limits. I mean, although I think that's also. That's a translation. A one, one person's translation is that.

02:06:49:23 - 02:07:44:15
Unknown
Yeah. Yeah. You're the Miller German first and then I'll get back to. Yeah. Um, um. Yeah, Yeah. So I think that there's some, there's some really important subtlety there, at least for to further investigate in some form. Yeah. Certainly doesn't have to be authoritative. Yeah. You know, uh oh, you know me, that's going to be difficult. I've got to be able to.

02:07:44:16 - 02:08:09:05
Unknown
But I think like. Yeah, not like you can't get a word on the page because what you want to say, Oh yeah, Like what you want to say may be just like questions. You have, uh, possible comparisons. It might actually be useful to look at the way that they're thinking. Stiehm writes the US like just a little a few haphazard investigations in some contexts.

02:08:09:07 - 02:08:36:06
Unknown
Yeah. Like, yeah. Or familiarity with his writing. I think what I like the reason I'm suggesting it is more for the form of writing, Okay. Um, because it's not authoritative, you'll see, at least not that authoritative. It's a lot of questioning and like, like an imaginary interlocutor. So imagine through someone answering these questions and then he responds, and then they go back and forth and never seem to reach like a definite conclusion.

02:08:36:08 - 02:09:21:13
Unknown
Okay, Yeah, that's what I mean. You don't feel like you need to take that either. No, I will at least sit and think with it to see if I feel like if I feel confident to go down that road and right on on a comparison or contrasting of those different perspectives or statements. Yeah, well, that's. Hmm. There's like, there's so much we could get to here.

02:09:21:13 - 02:09:43:20
Unknown
This is like, yeah, it's, it's pretty vague and I'm looking to see if there are other. Yeah. Specific things that I want to. Yeah. I think like the question is are with the like what is a world is like it's sort of nebulous is like yeah. Like I almost feel like it's, it's very difficult for me to come to a sort of direct definition.

02:09:43:20 - 02:10:04:16
Unknown
It's like, what do you mean? Yeah. Because he, he's, he's always using the term. Well, this is also, this is I think we we talked about this earlier, harmonization of the way that he's sort of perverting our normal ways of speaking. Yeah. To his own ends. Yeah. Um, but in some sense, he's sort of transforming our, our normal ways of speaking.

02:10:04:18 - 02:10:35:10
Unknown
So, like, I, like we often talk about worlds in terms of like, I like multiple worlds in terms of like different dimensions or like a multi dimensional universe, which different things are true in different dimensions. Um, yeah, but they're different, but they're typically like, like contingent truths, right? And in this typical language, multiple things can happen that way and yeah, or kind of factual.

02:10:35:10 - 02:10:58:06
Unknown
Okay. Yeah. Which is not, which is not necessarily is getting it right. Exactly. Yeah. Like entirely different. Yeah. Oh dimensions right. Yeah. Well yeah he says like, well I mean go back to the thing you were bringing up before. We're not speaking in terms of you brought this quote up before. Yeah. We're not speaking in terms of multiple possible alternatives to a single actual world of multiple actual worlds.

02:10:58:11 - 02:11:17:10
Unknown
Yeah, but not in the sense of like, like he's not getting at this some metaverse idea, like. Like we might see and what everything everywhere all at once. So no, because that is Yeah. The kind of like possible worlds of like Right. Working on getting into like modality or something like that, um, which is not what he's interested, right.

02:11:17:10 - 02:11:44:22
Unknown
He's not getting into modality, he's not getting into all the other, uh, other Oh, my gosh, what I can, I think possibly like, No, because that's more about counterfactuals. Oh, yeah. He's like any of the counterfactuals is is, I think with a modality. Yeah. Yeah, that is. Okay. So, so he's like getting into, like, contingent facts or counterfactual, like questions and ideas.

02:11:44:24 - 02:12:12:05
Unknown
Yeah, he's, he's, he's kind of in some sense without, like, just clearly saying it. He's kind of assuming there is this one world we all kind of inhabit. I think he's kind of insisting on a way of talking about this one world which doesn't use. I don't think so. I think he doesn't go past insisting on a way of talking.

02:12:12:07 - 02:12:35:12
Unknown
There's no about because the about is part of the way of talking. Hmm. Okay. Because he he is very insistent. Okay, maybe. But but, but there's there is a there's a sentence later where I feel like he he kind of slips up like waffles a little bit. Yeah. Or like, like, seems to still get back into this language.

02:12:35:12 - 02:12:56:20
Unknown
And maybe this is maybe this is just like a problem of of convention. And it's hard to get past certain conventions of talking. But, um, yeah, maybe it's, maybe it's this this world, indeed this world maybe with these recent comments. I see. And let me, let me start with the part I underline the physicist takes his world. That's a real one.

02:12:56:23 - 02:13:33:16
Unknown
Attributing the deletions, additions, irregularities, emphases of other versions to the imperfections of perception, to the urgencies of practice, to or to poetic license. The phenomena list regards the perceptual world as fundamental and the excisions abstractions, simplifications and distortions of other versions as resulting from scientific or practical or artistic concerns. For the man in the street, most versions of science, art and perception depart in some ways from the sorry from the familiar serviceable world he has Jerry built from fragments of scientific and artistic tradition, and from his own struggle for survival.

02:13:33:18 - 02:13:59:13
Unknown
This world indeed is the one most often taken as real for reality in a world like realism in a picture is largely a of habit. That's I think that's not that's not him waffling being taken as taking the Yeah yeah okay taken as real but then he's still a matter of habit reality in a world Yeah I guess he's confining it to like I think what he is precisely what he is like.

02:13:59:13 - 02:14:26:17
Unknown
Yeah he's sort of like almost making fun of the way in which we like because there is like the sort of, like everyday man, like layman way of thinking of like, like, oh, all these philosophers with their sort of abstruse nonsense, are getting away from the sort of concrete, ordinary way of speaking and thinking. And, and similarly, like, like, like, like the sort of person who is not familiar with art.

02:14:26:17 - 02:14:45:03
Unknown
Walking into an art museum might be skeptical of the way people speak about art and what is chosen to be presented. Totally. Yeah. And then someone who's only really in the art world might be skeptical when someone who's who's a physicist starts talking about. They do. Yeah. Yeah. So vice versa. Yeah, right. Yeah. And philosophers as well are skeptical of scientists.

02:14:45:03 - 02:15:10:13
Unknown
Yeah. And yeah, so like, there's, like, I think it's just like, it's just a matter of convention of sort of what were, what, what is the most habitual like, what do we encounter the most in our sort of everyday experience. That's what we take to be the most real and all of these as various like, like branching off way until the physicist certainly thinks of their version as the most real and so on and so forth.

02:15:10:15 - 02:15:39:19
Unknown
Uh But so maybe for good men we can say that there's only reality in the context of a context. There's only, there's only ever anything we can talk about as real. If it's confined to a world in which later we get into more about like he talks more about like symbols and conventions or well, not just later, actually, a little bit before.

02:15:39:19 - 02:16:04:04
Unknown
That's right. But yeah, just to quickly address that, I think there's probably some subtleties you could get into of like ways of talking about reality outside of world. But roughly, I think that there's a lot of, of rightness in that way of, of understanding of. Hmm. So do you think do you think okay, I guess it's something we've already answered, but I'll just ask you if you know.

02:16:04:05 - 02:16:31:20
Unknown
Yeah. Do you think good men thinks that there's such a thing? Okay, well, okay, so we kind of subconscious so we, we both agree that it's not that it for Goodman, it doesn't matter whether or not there's some reality outside of these these plural worlds that he's putting forth or talking about like it for Goodman. It doesn't like it doesn't give us anything.

02:16:31:20 - 02:17:14:03
Unknown
There's no value or meaning or verifiability in statements about reality beyond worlds. Do you do you think do you think that's true? So, like, I'm not even trying to get it. Does he think there's a numinous or something, right. A like some like ultimate reality, but just yeah, whether it makes sense to talk about like, like real or unreal or beyond or like, like in the meta context of worlds versus Yeah, know, it's in a particular world, Um, I think maybe, uh, I think roughly that, that makes sense to me.

02:17:14:05 - 02:17:49:22
Unknown
Um, I'm like, I feel like, I'm like, I'm waiting for the other shoe to fall If there being like an instance where, like, it might make sense to speak of them together, um, or like, I mean, because, like, there is a way in which the worlds, like, interface with each other or sort of like, like, grouped, um, and like, like we may like, yeah, like there is actually, like, there is a way in which he speaks about sort of like the, the fictional versus versus true worlds.

02:17:49:24 - 02:18:34:00
Unknown
Like, um, like, I like acknowledging the fact that the, like he makes a point of saying, like, acknowledging the fact that there are many worlds doesn't mean dismissing the fact that some of them are completely fictitious. Um, uh, and that are like, I think like, um, like what is the right way of yeah. Metric is the line between a statement and a world is sort of fuzzy to me is like when a liar lies, they're making a statement within a particular world, right?

02:18:34:02 - 02:19:00:17
Unknown
Um, but this is like, okay, so the world of astrology is not a real, like, not a real world. I, I think Goodwin would probably be like, yeah, it's not a real world in look sense. In what sense of real? It's like the entire conceptualization. Um, isn't. I mean, maybe you wouldn't be as dismissive as that and more like, in various ways.

02:19:00:17 - 02:19:23:24
Unknown
Like, it's not, it doesn't have any predictive value. So then it has this joke where he talks about how like, um, like, uh, like you can use folk psychology, so talk of beliefs and intentions in order to predict how people can behave. And so that's how, you know, there's some validity to it. Uh oh, yeah. He's talking in the context of poker.

02:19:24:01 - 02:19:51:22
Unknown
Like you can make money off of psychology by, like, predicting what people believe and other behaviors you can make money off of astrology other than by selling other people astrology. Okay, that makes sense. Yeah. Like you can't predict how people will behave reliably. There's through astrology. Is this sort of, like, tongue in cheek thing that, that, that makes, um, so okay in that sense.

02:19:51:22 - 02:20:28:12
Unknown
So in that sense, at least astrology might be taken to be not a real world. I think there are cases which I think there's sort of like through some kind of, um, yeah, I mean, I don't know, I think that still is sort of to, to like too much of a blanket statement because I think women might say we might be inclined to say anyway, everybody's welcome and thinks that there are ways in which you can conceive of astrology as um, as like real in the sort of in an individual's or in how it helps them understand their world.

02:20:28:13 - 02:21:16:18
Unknown
Um, and yeah, there are many ways in which a philosophy can't be validated through the means of like, of science or through like predictive means. But we may still seek to, we may still understand them as true because they help us conceptualize our world in a meaningful way. Yeah. Sort of understands ourselves better. Um Yeah. But I think that now, like the way in which say, the world of astrology connects to and is able to relate to and in like yeah, is able to relate to and translate to other worlds is maybe one way of evaluating the validity of, of the, of the world of astrology.

02:21:16:18 - 02:21:39:09
Unknown
Like, like astrology doesn't well to the world of physics. Right. Okay. Yeah. Well then it's no other. Yeah, right. Yeah. So like, we're already sort of like, we're not like, we're. Yeah. Okay. So we're never outside of a world saying something is is is real or unreal. It's always in the context. But you can still say a world is or a real.

02:21:39:09 - 02:22:09:09
Unknown
It's just within the context of another world. You're saying that. Yes, that's. Yeah, that's the term. There's also this like that all of our even our metro world talk is within a world. It's within the world of matter What. Right, right. Yeah. Better world. I love that. Huh? Okay, here's a here's a thought to going back to the question.

02:22:09:09 - 02:22:46:16
Unknown
What is good? What do you hear? What do you think about this? Goodman is laying down a metaphysics, a modernist metaphysics in which in which the the basis is worlds are a world. I don't know if I can I don't know if I can go along with that. And and in the description of what a world is at the bottom of the ladder for Goodman, in a sphere like, uh, well, I don't know.

02:22:46:16 - 02:23:05:01
Unknown
Yeah. If we, if we can describe a world and, and give it components, then it's no longer the base like substance, right? This is the plural. This a plural is a modernism. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It becomes a sort of irrelevant question. Okay, So I think. Yeah, I think like, maybe the answer, but do you think there's something there?

02:23:05:01 - 02:23:32:01
Unknown
No I think that is in the boy? Actually, that's exactly what he's doing. But also he's like he also sort of the subtext is he thinks it's a little silly to do that. Yeah but that's also what he's doing. Yeah. That is that sort of happening at the same time. So maybe like maybe he's doing it because maybe it's like just complete unavoidable to talk in terms of metaphysics.

02:23:32:03 - 02:23:52:00
Unknown
Hmm. Like you have to talk in terms of metaphysics, even if you think it's kind of silly to think so much about it and get into the weeds of like, what is the basic substance here? It's there. Just one or what are the substances if they're blending or whatever. Right. Um, well, metaphysics is a kind of world making.

02:23:52:02 - 02:24:31:06
Unknown
Yeah. Um, and it, well, okay, here's maybe an alternate way of saying it. It doesn't that's not framed in terms of metaphysics. It's like he's proposing an attitude towards metaphysics. Maybe, or maybe worlds more generally, if we don't necessarily want to. Can an attitude towards the metaphysics not not have its own metaphysical assumptions? It may not, because it's just sort what is your attitude towards your own beliefs and how do you sort of act upon your own beliefs and your own conceptions, which, okay, maybe that is the metaphysics and that beliefs are part of your metaphysics.

02:24:31:09 - 02:24:53:03
Unknown
Yeah, they exist. Yeah. This is like my role here. I think I might imagine this. I had an old professor would say, like anyone who says they don't have a metaphysics, just has a secret metaphysics. I think that's true. Which maybe in some sense is. I That's true. But this. Okay. I think this is just another way of stating the point that in order to say something, you have to say it in a particular language.

02:24:53:05 - 02:25:06:22
Unknown
So a world is always constructed from other worlds. Yeah, epistemology is always stated using sort of these preexisting conceptions and tools.

02:25:06:24 - 02:25:32:07
Unknown
So I think metaphysics is of meaningful endeavor. If it's if it's unavoidable to to ever talk about anything without some kind of metaphysical assumption. I mean, obviously on a day to day basis, we get by just fine without examining whatever many things may exist behind our language. But I think so. I think that, like I think there is an interesting like this is a point that I sometimes make to you.

02:25:32:07 - 02:25:58:05
Unknown
As I said, you have like language games and the idea of treating forms of speech, which we may not be prepared to accept physiologically as a kind of like game played with language. Um, of like, I think metaphysics can be valuable situated in the context that um, like you're not subscribing to, to one absolute view of the way that the universe is constituted.

02:25:58:07 - 02:26:26:06
Unknown
You may sort of drop it and pick up a different way as it suits you. Um, and uh, like it's just a way of speaking, which is useful insofar as it's useful. And then beyond that, you drop it. Um, so it's more of a practice than it is like a Bible or a constitution. Although Bibles and constitutions still need to be interpreted, right?

02:26:26:08 - 02:27:07:13
Unknown
Yeah. Um, yeah, which is a whole interesting thing. Uh, let's see. Yeah. Should we, should we maybe wrap up a little bit and, um. Yeah. Do you think there's any. Should we try to come up with some like, grand reading or. I don't know. I mean, we've kind of been I think we've done a good job of trying to execute throughout the way, and I don't think we've ever just fully left that.

02:27:07:13 - 02:27:41:22
Unknown
And I think we've always gone back to just trying to execute. Come in here. Do you think it's worthwhile to try to just say, interpret or apply things like this? Or do you think there's a you want to talk about things differently? Right. I think yeah. Uh, I think that we can validate the process that we've just gone through, um, using, through the lens of the way that good men evaluate themselves in the first paragraph before our way, which I don't know if you, if you took a look at I didn't take a look at it this time, but I'm pretty sure I read it last the first time through.

02:27:41:24 - 02:28:01:24
Unknown
So I just read it. This book does not run a straight course from beginning to end. It hunts in the hunting. It sometimes worries the same raccoon in different trees or different raccoons in the same tree, or even what turns out to be no raccoon in any tree. It finds itself barking more than once at the same here and taking off on others.

02:28:02:01 - 02:28:30:18
Unknown
It drinks often from the same streams and stumbles over some cruel country, and it counts not to kill. What is learned of the territory explored. That reminds me. Sorry if I can go past the and do another ending of of something he says the third to last paragraph. I think the first paragraph of the final section. Maybe I can just read this one.

02:28:30:20 - 02:28:52:04
Unknown
That's Okay. What I have been saying I maybe I don't need to start at the top, but I'll just sort of talk what I have been saying bears on the nature of knowledge, and this is where I got it. He's putting the pluralistic at the moment because he said he's what I have been saying bears on the nature of knowledge, on these terms, knowing to not be exclusively or even primarily a matter of determining what is true.

02:28:52:06 - 02:29:34:01
Unknown
Discovery often amounts as when I place a piece in a jigsaw puzzle not to arrival at a proposition for declaration or defense, but to finding a shift. Much of knowing aims at something other than true, or any belief an increase in acuity of insight or in range of comprehension, rather than a change in belief, occurs when we find in a picture forest a face that we already knew was there or learned to distinguish stylistic differences among already classified by artists, by artist or composer or writer, or study a picture or a concerto or a treatise until we see or hear or grasp features and structures which we cannot discern before.

02:29:34:03 - 02:30:15:14
Unknown
Such growth in knowledge is not by formation or fixation or belief, but by the advancement of understanding. Well, that's great. I love this. You've really got it there. But yeah, that does relate to the to the attitude thing I was saying. I like Yeah. That like what he's putting for like, yeah. Or like we can think about knowledge and not as the acquisition of new facts but as like a way of orienting ourselves towards the world which has certain merits.

02:30:15:16 - 02:30:38:19
Unknown
Yeah, you know, maybe, maybe the times where I feel like I'm, I'm rubbing up against something in, in the text here is like maybe I'm reading that like, like he's trying to tell me something about the world and I'm still stuck in this idea of the world. And that's why I may be thinking, what? Maybe he's proposing a metaphysics that he does, even though he's and maybe he still is.

02:30:38:19 - 02:31:19:06
Unknown
I don't know. But yeah, but, but yeah, like you said. What? What's an attitude. It's an attitude yet he's putting forth An attitude suggesting an attitude, maybe an epistemological attitude. Maybe we could say that and not, maybe not. And like a well, now maybe we can. Maybe I can see this after finishing the book, but maybe he's not putting forth like a and a strict epistemological system here, but a well thought out, well-articulated epistemological attitude that's under there.

02:31:19:06 - 02:31:20:05
Unknown
That's a good place that.